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Summary. Terrorism persists as a worldwide threat, as exemplified by the ongoing
lethal attacks perpetrated by ISIS in Iraq, Syria, Al Qaeda in Yemen, and Boko Haram
in Nigeria. In response, states deploy various counterterrorism policies, the costs
of which could be reduced through efficient preventive measures. Statistical models
able to account for complex spatio-temporal dependencies have not yet been applied,
despite their potential for providing guidance to explain and prevent terrorism. In an
effort to address this shortcoming, we employ hierarchical models in a Bayesian con-
text, where the spatial random field is represented by a stochastic partial differential
equation. Our main findings suggest that lethal terrorist attacks tend to generate more
deaths in ethnically polarised areas and in locations within democratic countries. Fur-
thermore, the number of lethal attacks increases close to large cities and in locations
with higher levels of population density and human activity.
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1. Introduction
Terrorism represents a worldwide threat, illustrated by the ongoing deadly attacks
perpetrated by the Islamic State (also called ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh) in Iraq and Syria,
Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the al-Nusra Front (also called Jabhat al-Nusra) in Syria
for example. In response to this threat, states may use a combination of counterter-
rorism policies, which include the use of criminal justice, military power, intelligence,
psychological operations, and preventives measures (Crelinsten, 2009, p. 45). In par-
ticular, following the tragic terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) in New
York, states have tended to increase their spending to counter terrorism. From 2001
to 2008, the expenditure of worldwide homeland security increased by US$ 70 billion
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(NATO, 2008). In the US alone, the 2013 federal budget devoted to combat terrorism
reached around US$ 17.2 billion (The Washington Post, 2013).
Theoretical work and empirical studies at country-level pointed out that the
causes of terrorism are complex and multidimensional and include economic, political,
social, cultural, and environmental factors (Brynjar and Skjølberg, 2000; Richardson,
2006, p. 60; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011; Hsiang
et al., 2013). Moreover, the relationship between specific factors and terrorism is
often not straightforward. For example, Hoffman (2006, p. 194) described the role
of media in covering terrorism as a “double-edged sword”. Publicity promotes ter-
rorist groups, which facilitates the recruitment of new members and strengthens the
cohesion of groups, but in turn, encourages society to marshal resources to combat
terrorism (Rapoport, 1996). At the individual level, the actions and beliefs of each
member of terrorist groups are important drivers of terrorism as well (Crenshaw,
1983, p.29; Wilkinson, 1990, p.141; Richardson, 2006, pp.92-93).
The activity of terrorism may also vary over time and often exhibits temporally
clustered patterns like crime or insurgencies (Anselin et al., 2000; Eck et al., 2005;
Zammit-Mangion et al., 2012). Similar to contagious diseases (Jacquez, 1996; Mantel,
1967; Loftin, 1986) or seismic activity (Mohler et al., 2011; Crough and Jurdy, 1980;
Courtillot et al., 2003), terrorist events are rarely homogeneously distributed in space.
In contrast, they tend to exhibit high concentration levels in specific locations (so-
called hot-spots) (LaFree et al., 2009, 2010, 2012; Nacos, 2010; Steen et al., 2006;
Piegorsch et al., 2007).
Despite successful applications of space-time Bayesian models in similar fields of
research, such as crime and conflict (Zammit-Mangion et al., 2012, 2013; Mohler,
2013; Lewis et al., 2012; Rodrigues et al., 2010), these models have not yet been
applied in terrorism research. Most empirical research in terrorism has focused on
its temporal dimension (Hamilton and Hamilton, 1983; Porter and White, 2012;
Brandt and Sandler, 2012; Barros, 2003; Suleman, 2012; Bilal et al., 2012; Enders
and Sandler, 1993, 2005; Enders et al., 2011; Raghavan et al., 2013), or has considered
purely spatial models only (Braithwaite and Li, 2007; Savitch and Ardashev, 2001;
Brown et al., 2004). Moreover, studies that have explicitly combined both space and
time dimensions have been carried out at country level, on larger geographical areas
(LaFree et al., 2010; Midlarsky et al., 1980; Neumayer and Plu¨mper, 2010; Enders
and Sandler, 2006; Gao et al., 2013; LaFree et al., 2017), or at subnational level of
analysis but within specific study areas (LaFree et al., 2012; Behlendorf et al., 2012;
Nunn, 2007; Piegorsch et al., 2007; O¨cal and Yildirim, 2010; Medina et al., 2011;
Siebeneck et al., 2009; Mohler, 2013).
As a result, scholars have failed to systematically capture the subnational spa-
tial dynamics of terrorism. Local drivers of terrorism have not been identified and
their effects have not been systematically assessed. In an effort to address these
shortcomings, we use space-time Bayesian models based on the stochastic partial
differential equation (SPDE) approach implemented through computationally effi-
cient integrated nested Laplace approximation (INLA) techniques (Rue et al., 2009;
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Lindgren et al., 2011). Our approach, which combines spatially explicit covariates
and data on terrorist events, allows us to capture local-scale spatial patterns of: (i)
lethality : the propensity of terrorist attack to be lethal; (ii) severity : the number
of deaths given that the attack is lethal; (iii) frequency : the total number of lethal
attacks per location.
By specifically accounting for the local-scale dependence structure of the data,
the effects of potential drivers of the lethality of terrorism, severity, and frequency
of lethal terrorist attacks across the world from 2010 to 2015 are assessed at a sub-
national level. The results of this study could benefit policy makers needing a sys-
tematic and spatially accurate assessment of the security threat posed by deadly
terrorist activity. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the
data used for the analysis. The statistical models are described in Section 2.2 and
the results are provided in Section 3. Finally, conclusions and recommendations for
further research are discussed in Section 4. The computer code used in this paper is
available in supplementary material.
2. Data Selection
2.1. Terrorism database
In order to build valuable, empirically-based models, it is crucial to base an analysis
on a data source that is as suitable as possible for a given study (Zammit-Mangion
et al., 2012). There are currently four major databases that provide data on world-
wide non-state terrorism (terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors): the Global
Terrorism Database (GTD), the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents
(RDWTI), the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE),
and the Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT). ITERATE has
been extensively referred to in terrorism research (Enders et al., 2011), however,
events are geolocalised at the country level, which does not allow to capture subna-
tional processes. GDELT is not suitable for our purpose since it does not provide
information on the lethality of terrorist events. Equally problematic, GDELT uses a
fully automated coding system based on Conflict and Mediation Event Observations
(CAMEO) (for further information on CAMEO, see: http://data.gdeltproject.
org/documentation/CAMEO.Manual.1.1b3.pdf), which may lead to a strong geo-
graphic bias, as mentioned by Hammond and Weidmann (2014).
Hence, RDWTI and GTD are the only potentially relevant databases that provide
geolocalised terrorist events across the world. Drawing from Sheehan’s approach to
compare terrorism databases (2012), we defined four criteria to select the one which
will be used in our study: conceptual clarity, scope, coding method, and spatial ac-
curacy. Given that the concept of terrorism is intrinsically ambiguous and being
debated to this day (Beck and Miner, 2013), conceptual clarity in both the definition
of terrorist events and the coding method used to gather data are crucial. In both
GTD and RDWTI, the definition used to class an event as terrorism is clearly spec-
ified. The coding method of GTD appears more rigorous, since events are gathered
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from numerous sources and articles. On a monthly average, out of 400,000 articles
detected as potential sources of information, 16,000 (4%) are considered relevant
(GTD, 2017). The thorough review and analysis of various independent sources per-
formed by GTD experts limits the risk of bias resulting from possible inconsistencies
in the way terrorist events are reported by the media, as pointed out by Drakos and
Gofas (2006) and Drakos (2007). The data collection methodology used in RDWTI
is less reliable since some events are gathered from two sources only. Moreover, the
scope of GTD is wider than RDWTI. GTD is updated annually and includes more
than 170,000 events from 1970 until 2016 (START, 2017), whereas RDWTI was not
updated after 2009 and includes 40,129 events from 1969 to 2009 only (RAND, 2011).
Since this research investigates subnational spatial phenomena, we put particular
emphasis on the spatial accuracy of the data. GTD is the only database that includes
a variable assigning the spatial accuracy of each individual observation. Spatial accu-
racy is represented by an ordinal variable called specificity, with 5 possible levels
of spatial accuracy (for further information on specificity, see GTD codebook:
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf). Based on all these
considerations we have chosen GTD as the appropriate data source for this study.
The dataset contains 57,323 spatially accurate events (events corresponding to the
highest levels of spatial accuracy, with specificity = {1, 2}), occurring between
2010 and 2016.
2.2. Covariates
A thorough review of 43 studies carried out at country level by Gassebner and
Luechinger (2011), along with global studies carried out at local level (Python et al.,
2017; LaFree et al., 2017; Nemeth, 2010), suggested a wide range of covariates rel-
evant to the occurrence of terrorist events. Among those, we consider covariates
that satisfy two essential characteristics: (i) potential relationship with the lethality
of terrorism and/or severity and/or frequency of lethal terrorist attacks; (ii) avail-
ability at high spatial resolution, in order to model subnational spatial dynamics
of terrorism worldwide. Seven spatial and space-time covariates met these criteria;
their potential association with terrorism is described in more detail below: satellite
night light (lum), population density (pop), ethnic polarisation (ethpol), political
regime (pol), altitude (alt), slope (slo), travel time to the nearest large city (tt), and
distance to the nearest national border (distb).
First, we assess the role of economic factors, whose possible effects are still under
debate. Most country-level empirical studies have not provided any evidence of a
linear relationship between terrorism and gross domestic product (GDP) (Abadie,
2006; Drakos and Gofas, 2006; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Krueger and Laitin,
2008; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Piazza, 2006), without excluding possible non-
linear relationship (Enders and Hoover, 2012). Case studies focused in the Middle
East, including Israel and Palestine, showed that GDP is not significantly related
to the number of suicide terrorist attacks (Berman and Laitin, 2008). Few studies,
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however, found that countries with high per capita GDP may encounter high levels
of terrorist attacks (Tavares, 2004; Blomberg and Rosendorff, 2009). In line with
the subnational nature of our study, we use NOAA satellite lights at night (Version
4 DMSP-OLS) as a covariate, which provides information about worldwide human
activities on a yearly basis and at a high spatial resolution (30 arc-second grid or
≈ 1 [km] at the Equator) (Chen and Nordhaus, 2011; NOAA, 2014). This variable
has been used as a proxy for socio-economic development measures such as per capita
GDP estimation (Sutton and Costanza, 2002; Sutton et al., 2007; Elvidge et al., 2007;
Ebener et al., 2005; Henderson et al., 2009).
Second, we assess the role of demography. Cities may provide more human mobil-
ity, anonymity, audiences and a larger recruitment pool in comparison to rural areas
(Crenshaw, 1990, p. 115; Savitch and Ardashev, 2001). Large cities, in particular,
offer a high degree of anonymity for terrorists to operate (Laqueur, 1999, p. 41).
More specifically, densely populated areas appear vulnerable and are usually more
prone to terrorism than sparsely populated areas (Ross, 1993; Savitch and Arda-
shev, 2001; Crenshaw, 1981; Swanstrom, 2002; Coaffee, 2010). In addition, locations
that shelter high-value symbolic targets (buildings or installations), human targets
(government officials, mayors, etc.), and public targets (public transports, shopping
centres, cinemas, sport arenas, public venues, etc.) are particularly vulnerable to
suicide terrorism (Hoffman, 2006, p. 167). We use the (v4) Gridded Population of
the World (CIESIN, 2016), which provides population density on a five-year basis
and at high-resolution (30 arc-second grid). Moreover, terrorists usually require free
and rapid movement by rail or road in order to move from and to target points
(Heyman and Mickolus, 1980; Wilkinson, 1979, p. 189). We compute the travel time
from each terrorist event to the nearest large city (more than 50,000 inhabitants)
based on Travel Time to Major Cities (Nelson, 2008) at a high spatial resolution (30
arc-second grid).
Third, we assess the role of geographical variables: altitude, surface topography
(slope), and distance to the nearest national border. Although the relationship be-
tween altitude, slope, and terrorism is not straightforward, both variables provide
geographical information on the location of the events, which could be a determining
factor for terrorists regarding their choice of target (Ross, 1993). Moreover, Nemeth
et al. (2014) suggested that distance to the nearest national border and altitude or
slope might have an impact on terrorist activity. We extract both variables from
NOAA Global Relief Model (ETOPO1), which provides altitude values at high spa-
tial resolution (1 arc-minute grid) (Amante and Eakins, 2009).
Fourth, we assess the role of democracy. Under-reporting biases may occur espe-
cially in non-democratic countries where the press is often not free (Drakos and Gofas,
2006; Drakos, 2007). We extract the level of democracy from Polity IV Project, Po-
litical Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2016 (Polity IV) (Marshall and
Elzinga-Marshall, 2014). Polity IV informs about the level of freedom of press, and
captures the level of democracy from −10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consoli-
dated democracy) for most independent countries from 1800 to 2016. It has been
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commonly referred as proxy for measuring the type of regime or the extent of con-
straints in democratic institutions (Gleditsch, 2007; Li, 2005; Piazza, 2006).
Fifth, we assess the role of ethnic division, proxied by ethnic polarisation gath-
ered from the data provided in Python et al. (2017), who computed several indices
at subnational level, based on “Georeferencing of ethnic groups” (GREG) ethnic
database—the digitalised version of the Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira (ANM) which
counts 1,276 ethnic groups around the world (Weidmann et al., 2010). Ethnic divi-
sion is commonly measured through ethnic fractionalisation or ethnic polarisation.
The former represents the probability that two individuals randomly chosen within
an area belong to two different ethnic groups. The maximum occurs when each indi-
vidual belongs to a different ethnic group. The latter highlights the ability of ethnic
groups to engage in a conflict and reaches a maximum in areas with two confronting
ethnic groups of equal size (Esteban et al., 2012; Alesina et al., 2003; Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol, 2005).
In the context of ethnic conflict, terrorists may deliberately target ethnically
polarised societies in order to rise ethnic tensions, which may lead to ethnic conflict.
Consequently, government may carry out disproportionate and violent repressive
measures towards the warring parties and innocent people, who in turn might end up
supporting terrorist organisations to fight government policies (Posen, 1993; Kalyvas,
2006; Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007). Therefore, we expect that ethnically polarised
areas should be more targeted by terrorist groups, who may use terrorism as a
“provocation” strategy (Fromkin, 1975; Kydd and Walter, 2006).
2.3. SPDE Framework
We assume that the characteristics of terrorism under consideration—lethality of
terrorism, severity, and frequency of lethal terrorist attacks—are continuous phe-
nomena with Gaussian properties, which exhibit dependencies in both space and
time. We suggest modelling their spatial dynamics through the SPDE approach in-
troduced by Lindgren et al. (2011). The solution of the SPDE given in Equation (1)
is a Gaussian field (GF) (Lindgren et al., 2011), whose approximation represents a
Gaussian Markov random field (GMRF) used herein to model the spatio-temporal
dependencies inherent in the data. The linear SPDE can be formulated as:
(κ2 −∆)γ/2(τζ(s)) = (s), s ∈ D , (1)
with the Laplacian ∆, smoothness parameter γ = λ + 1 (for two-dimensional pro-
cesses), scale parameter κ > 0, variance parameter τ , domain D, and Gaussian
spatial white noise (s) (Blangiardo and Cameletti, 2015, chapter 6). The stationary
solution of Equation (1) is the GF (ζ(s)) with Mate´rn correlation function:
Cov(ζ(si), ζ(sj)) = σ
2
ζ
1
Γ(λ)2λ−1
(
κ ‖si − sj‖
)λ
Kλ
(
κ ‖si − sj‖
)
, (2)
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where ‖si − sj‖ is the Euclidean distance between two locations, σ2ζ is the marginal
variance, and Kλ is the modified Bessel function of the second kind and order λ > 0.
The distance from which the spatial correlation becomes negligible (for λ > 0.5) is
given by the range r (vertical dotted line in Figure 1, left, centre and right), which
can be empirically derived from the scale parameter r =
√
8λ/κ to be estimated.
The GF (ζ(s)) is approximated as a GMRF through a finite element method using
basis functions defined on a constrained refined Delaunay triangulation (mesh) over
the earth, modelled as a sphere (Figure 2) (Lindgren, 2015; Lindgren et al., 2011).
Here, we use a Bayesian hierarchical modelling framework (Banerjee et al., 2014) to
model (i) the lethality (L-model) of terrorism, (ii) the severity (S-model) of lethal
terrorist attacks, and (iii) the frequency of lethal terrorist attacks (F -model).
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Fig. 1: Mate´rn correlation function. Mate´rn correlation function (solid line)
with parameters λ = 1 and its CI95% (dashed lines) illustrated for the (left): lethality
of terrorism (L-model), (centre): severity of lethal attacks (S-model), and (right):
frequency of lethal attacks (F -model). The corresponding posterior mean range of
the Mate´rn correlation function parameters are: rL ≈ 192 [km] (left), rS ≈ 245 [km]
(centre), and rF ≈ 192 [km] (right). The vertical dotted lines (left, centre, right)
correspond to spatial correlation ≈ 0.1 (horizontal dotted line)
2.4. Modelling the Lethality, Severity and Frequency of Lethal Terrorism
Terrorist attacks occur at specific locations on earth and are therefore inherently
discrete. However, we consider three characteristics of terrorism: potential to kill
(lethality L), number of deadly victims (severity S), and the number of lethal attacks
(frequency F ) as continuous phenomena (in the sense of geostatistics (Cressie, 1991)),
which are observed at s locations (attacks) over the surface of the earth S2 at time
t ∈ R. A better understanding of these three facets of lethal terrorism by city
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Fig. 2: Constrained refined Delaunay triangulation (mesh). Illustrations
of the meshes on top of which the SPDE and its approximate solutions (GMRF)
are constructed (Lindgren, 2012). We used mesh with 5,706 vertices (left) to fit the
models and rougher meshes for robustness tests, with 2,157 (centre) and 1,341 (right)
vertices, respectively
planners, emergency managers, insurance companies, and property administrators
may allow them to better allocate resources used to prevent and counter terrorism
(Piegorsch et al., 2007; Nunn, 2007).
The lethality, frequency, and severity are assumed to be the realisations of contin-
uously indexed space-time processes L(s, t), S(s, t), F (s, t) ≡ {l(s, t), s(s, t), f(s, t) :
(s, t) ∈ D ⊆ S2 × R}, from which inference can be made about the processes at any
desired locations in the space-time domain D (Cameletti et al., 2013). Hence, we
define three corresponding hierarchical models:
(a) L-model (lethality of terrorism):
L(si, t)|θL, ζ˜L(si, t) ∼ Bernoulli(pi(si, t)) (3a)
logit(pi(si, t)) = βL0 + xL(si, t)βL + ζ˜L(si, t) + L(si, t) (3b)
θL ∼ p(θL). (3c)
(b) S-model (severity of lethal terrorism):
S(sj , t)|θS , ζ˜S(si, t) ∼ Poisson(µS(sj , t)) (4a)
log(µS(sj , t)) = βS0 + xS(sj , t)βS + ζ˜S(sj , t) + S(sj , t) (4b)
θS ∼ p(θS). (4c)
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(c) F -model (frequency of lethal terrorism):
F (sk, t)|θF , ζ˜F (sk, t) ∼ Poisson(µF (sk, t)) (5a)
log(µF (sk, t)) = βF0 + xF (sk, t)βF + ζ˜F (sk, t) + F (sk, t) (5b)
θF ∼ p(θF ). (5c)
The lethality of terrorism L(si, t) is a dichotomous variable that takes the value
1 if the attack generated one or more deaths, and 0 if not. The random variable is
assumed to come from a Bernoulli distribution (Equation (3a)). From GTD (2017),
information on lethality is gathered from all observed space-time locations si =
{1, . . . , 45, 555} of terrorist attacks that occurred worldwide between year t = 2010
and t = 2015 (we kept 2016 for predictions). The linear predictor logit(pi(si, t)) of
the L-model includes a vector of m covariates xL(si, t) = (xL1(si, t), . . . , xLm(si, t))
with coefficient vector βL = (βL1, . . . , βLm)
′, a GMRF ζ˜L(si, t), and Gaussian white
noise L(si, t) ∼ N(0, σ2L), with measurement error variance σ2L (Equation (3b)).
The severity S(sj , t) counts the number of deaths given that the attack is lethal
and follows a Poisson distribution (Equation (4a)). Here, the observed number of
deaths represents a subset consisting of sj = {1, . . . , 24, 049} space-time locations.
The linear predictor log(µS(sj , t)) (Equation (4b)) of the S-model, includes a vector
of l covariates xS(sj , t) = (xS1(sj , t), . . . , xSl(sj , t)) with coefficient vector βS =
(βS1, . . . , βSm)
′, a GMRF ζ˜S(sj , t), and Gaussian white noise S(sj , t) ∼ N(0, σ2S),
with measurement error variance σ2S .
The frequency F (sk, t) counts the number of lethal attacks that occurred between
t = 2010 and t = 2015 within a 0.5◦ radius (≈ 55 [km] at the Equator) of cities’
centroids, which is consistent with spatial uncertainty in the data (see Section 2.1).
We assume that F (sk, t) follows a Poisson distribution. Since we model a “count”
variable, it is convenient to aggregate events that occurred in very close locations
within identical municipality areas for example. This has resulted in spatial ag-
gregation reducing the number of observations from 24,049 to sk = {1, . . . , 6, 948}
locations. The linear predictor log(µF (skt)) (Equation (5b)) of the F -model, in-
cludes a vector of q covariates xF (sk, t) = (xF1(sk, t), . . . , xFq(sk, t)) with coeffi-
cient vector βF = (βF1, . . . , βFq)
′, a GMRF ζ˜F (sk, t), and Gaussian white noise
F (sk, t) ∼ N(0, σ2F ), with measurement error variance σ2F .
In order to minimise the complexity of the models, and consequently, reduce the
computing time required to fit them, we assume a separable space-time covariance
(Blangiardo and Cameletti, 2015, chapter 7). The results of a preliminary analysis
using a first-order autoregressive model (AR(1)) provided a posterior mean value
of the autoregressive parameter of the AR(1) very close to 1 (results not reported).
Hence, we let the GMRF (ζ˜L) follow a first-order random walk (RW(1)), so that:
ζ˜L(si, t)|ζ˜L(si,t−1) ∼ N(ζ˜L(si,t−1), σ2rw), with Cov(ζ˜L(si, t), ζ˜L(sl, u)) = 0 if t 6= u,
and Cov(ζ˜L(si), ζ˜L(sl)) if t = u,∀t, u ∈ {2010, . . . , 2015}. Likewise, ζ˜S and ζ˜F follow
a RW(1) with a separable space-time covariance.
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Drawing from recent development of complex spatio-temporal latent Gaussian
models (Jones-Todd et al., 2017), interactions between the lethality of terrorism and
severity of lethal terrorist events might be represented through a joint latent mod-
elling approach. However, we did not opt for this approach, since it resulted in a
non-significant multiplier parameter of the shared GMRF (zero included within the
95% credible interval (CI95%)), which considerably decreased the predictive perfor-
mance of the model (results not reported).
Prior distributions are set for the parameters to be estimated (θL,θS ,θF ) (Equa-
tions (3c, 4c, and 5c)). We use default priors provided by R-INLA, which consist in
i.i.d. zero-mean Normal distributions, with precision equals to 0.001 for the fixed
effects (βL,βS ,βF ) and unstructured random effects (L, S , F ). An improper uni-
form prior between −∞ and ∞ is set on the intercepts (βL0, βS0, βF0).
With regard to the parameters of the Mate´rn correlation function ζ˜L, ζ˜S , and ζ˜F ,
we use Penalised complexity (PC) priors—informative priors invariant to reparam-
eterisation which favour parsimonious model formulations based on the Kullback-
Leibler divergence (Kullback and Leibler, 1951) and allow the user to set sensible
scale and values for the investigated parameter (Simpson et al., 2017; Fuglstad et al.,
2017). We set a 50% probability that: (i) the standard deviation is above 1 and (ii)
the range is above 0.3 (≈ 1, 911 [km]).
These weakly informative PC priors assume: (i) a relative high variation in the
spatial correlation of terrorist events, and (ii) terrorist events should not substan-
tially influence each other beyond relatively large distances (≈ 1, 911 [km]) e.g.
through demonstration and imitation processes promoted by the media (Brosius and
Weimann, 1991; Enders et al., 1992; Brynjar and Skjølberg, 2000). This threshold
seems reasonable for most attacks, apart from those highly publicised (e.g. mass-
casualty attacks perpetrated by ISIS), which may have a wider (sometimes world-
wide) influence on other terrorist groups or individuals to commit copycat attacks
(Nacos, 2016, p. 112).
Without any specific prior knowledge on the temporal structure, we use the de-
fault PC prior settings suggested in R-INLA for the RW(1) temporal structure of
the GMRF with variance σ2rw, where P (σ
2
rw > 1 = 0.01), which assumes a variance
very likely lower than 1. For prior sensitivity analysis, the results are compared
with alternative priors on the parameters of the Mate´rn covariance function, which
is further discussed in Section 3.
3. Results
3.1. Explaining the Spatial Dynamics of Terrorism
We use INLA as an accurate and computationally effective model fitting alternative
to MCMC (Rue et al., 2009; Held et al., 2010; Simpson et al., 2016; Martino and Rue,
2010). With a 12-core Linux machine (Intel Xeon R© cpu, 99 GB RAM, Open Multi-
Processing parallel computing), R-INLA (coded in C) requires between 9 to 14 hours
to fit each model using high resolution mesh (5,706 vertices, see Figure 2). We select
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the most parsimonious models through backward elimination, which initiates with
all available covariates and, at each step, removes one by one the variable, whose loss
minimises potential increase of the Watanabe-Akaike Information Criterion (WAIC).
Thus, we select the models with the lowest WAIC (Watanabe, 2010). One may
reasonably assume that that differences across countries have some influence on some
characteristics of terrorism. The S and F models include a country random-effect.
However it is not included in the L-model since it decreases considerably the fitting
performance (results not reported).
In line with most country-level studies (Ross, 1993; Savitch and Ardashev, 2001;
Crenshaw, 1981; Swanstrom, 2002; Coaffee, 2010), the F -model (Table 1) suggests
that a higher number of lethal terrorist attacks are expected in areas with higher
levels of population density and human activity (CI95% βpop, βlum > 0) and close to
large cities (CI95% βtt < 0). While fewer deaths are expected close to large cities
(CI95% βtt > 0), the S-model shows that the number of deaths tends to increase
in locations within democratic countries (CI95% βpol > 0). As pointed out by Li
(2005), the presence of freedom of speech, movement, and association in democratic
countries might reduce the costs to conduct terrorist activities compared to those in
autocratic countries. More specifically, the results provide support to Pape (2003,
2006), who expects democracies to be more heavily targeted by high-casualty attacks
(e.g. suicide terrorism), which often aim at coercing democratic governments to
withdraw their presence from areas considered by terrorists as their motherland.
Consistent with country-level (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Kurrild-Klitgaard
et al., 2006) and subnational-level (Nemeth et al., 2014; Python et al., 2017) findings,
we found that ethnic polarisation is positively associated with the severity of the
attacks (S-model) (CI95% βethpol > 0), which supports the theory that terrorism is
used as a strategy of provocation (Section 2.2). These results are further discussed in
Section 4. Despite potential effects (CI95% βtt, βborder > 0) observed in the L-model,
they are not further analysed. The effects of βborder and βtt are very weak—a 10
−3
order of magnitude at the limits of their 95% CI.
As an illustration, we compare the effect of an hypothetical 50% increase in lumi-
nosity (lum) on the expected number of lethal attacks (µF in the F -model), which
corresponds to an increase from 0 to ≈ 0.23 on a standardised scale. With all
predictors held equal to 0, the linear predictor (Equation (5b)) equals 0 and µF =
exp(η) = exp(0) = 1. With 50% more luminosity, η = βlum×lum ∼= 0.59×0.23 ∼= 0.14
(βlum ∼= 0.59, see Table 1, columns “F -model”). Hence, µF ∼= exp(0.14) ∼= 1.15. It
results that 50% more luminosity increases the expected number of lethal attacks by
approximately 15%.
Furthermore, we compare the in-sample predictive performance between the se-
lected models through the WAIC (see Table 1, column ‘GoF’). All selected models
show better performance than the zero-covariate models, indicated by lower WAIC
values. We further investigate the out-of-sample predictive performance of the mod-
els, based on the conditional predictive ordinate (CPO) (column ‘CPO’ in Table 1)—
a “leave-one-out” cross-validation approach, where CPOi = P (yi|y−i) predicts the
12 Python et al.
value of observation yi given the values observed elsewhere y−i (Gilks et al., 1996;
Gelfand et al., 1992; Gilks et al., 1996; Pettit, 1990). In addition, we use the root-
mean square error (RMSE) to compare the ability of the models to predict 2016
values using data from five previous years (2010-2015) exclusively.
With regard to the out-of-sample predictive performance, the performance of the
L, S and F models compared with their respective zero-covariate models appears
very similar, which indicates that the GMRF is the main driver and the effects of
the covariates are of less importance for the purpose of out-of-sample predictions
(see Table 1, column ‘GoF’).
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3.2. Quantifying the Uncertainty
As a further step, we explore the spatial dynamics of terrorism by visualising relevant
parameters that vary in both space and time. For this purpose, the posterior mean
and standard deviation of the GMRFs provide valuable insight into the understand-
ing of the spatial dynamics of terrorism and more particularly, of the uncertainty
in the predictions of the lethality (pi(s, t)) of terrorism, and severity (µS(s, t)) and
frequency (µF (s, t)) of lethal terrorist attacks. High values of the posterior standard
deviation signify that there is high uncertainty with regard to the estimated values
of the posterior mean of the GMRFs, mainly due to the scarcity or absence of data.
Some areas have not encountered any terrorist attack during the entire period and
therefore exhibit persistently high values, such as Siberia, the Amazonian region,
Central Australia, or Greenland. In contrast, several regions strongly affected by
terrorism in South America, Africa, Gulf Peninsula, India and Pakistan exhibit less
uncertainty and therefore lower values of the posterior standard deviation in 2010
(Figures 3b, 4b, and 5b) and 2015 (Figures 3e, 4e, and 5e).
3.3. Hot-spots
The identification of hot-spots is highly valuable since it highlights areas more vul-
nerable to terrorism, which call for increased vigilance. We identify regions of ab-
normally high values (hot-spots) of the lethality of terrorism, and the severity and
frequency of lethal attacks from the estimated posterior distribution of the vari-
able of interest, interpolated in all space-time locations s, t ∈ D. For each year
(t = 2010, . . . , 2015), we identify locations (using a 1, 440× 720 grid) where the 95%
credible interval (CI) for the corresponding variable is above a threshold α:
HCI95%ν(s, t) > α, s, t ∈ D, (6)
where α is the threshold, D is the domain, and HCI95%ν(s, t) is the lower bound of the
95% CI of the variable under consideration (lethality, severity, and frequency). We
consider the group of contiguous locations ν(s, t)—we used a first-order neighbour-
hood to define contiguity—that satisfy Equation (6); for lethality, we use α = 0.5,
which means that we define hot-spot areas where it is more likely to have lethal
attacks than non-lethal attacks. In other terms, we are 95% confident that the
true value of the probability of lethal attack is greater than 50%. For severity and
frequency hot-spots, we use a threshold corresponding to the 90th percentile of the
observed corresponding variable in the sample; namely 9 deaths and 11 lethal attacks,
respectively.
Important changes are observed in the lethality of terrorism (Figures 6a, 6b), and
severity (Figures 6c, 6d) and frequency of lethal terrorist attacks (Figures 6e, 6f) in
various locations in Afghanistan from 2010 to 2015.
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(a) Hot-spot of lethality (2010)
(HCI95%pi(s, 2010) > 0.5)
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(b) Hot-spot of lethality (2015)
(HCI95%pi(s, 2015) > 0.5)
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(c) Hot-spot of severity (2010)
(HCI95% log(µS(s, 2010)) > 2.2)
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(d) Hot-spot of severity (2015)
(HCI95% log(µS(s, 2015)) > 2.2)
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(e) Hot-spot of frequency (2010)
(HCI95% log(µF (s, 2010)) > 2.4)
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(f) Hot-spot of frequency (2015)
(HCI95% log(µF (s, 2015)) > 2.4)
Fig. 6: Lethality, severity and frequency hot-spots (2010 and 2015): il-
lustrative maps. The maps highlights the main areas impacted by high levels of
lethal terrorism from 2010 to 2015 and show hot-spots of lethality (2010: Figure 6a,
2015: Figure 6b), severity (2010: Figure 6c, 2015: Figure 6d), and frequency of
lethal attacks (2010: Figure 6e, 2015: Figure 6f)). Hot-spots are identified if the
lower bound of the 95% credible intervals is: (i) lethality: pi(s) > 0.5; (ii) severity
log(µS(s)) > 2.2 = log(9); (iii) frequency log(µF (s)) > 2.4 = log(11).
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3.4. Robustness tests
The choice of prior distribution remains challenging even for stationary GMRFs char-
acterised only by range and marginal variance (Fuglstad et al., 2017). As a robustness
test, we run a prior sensitivity analysis for the L, S, and the F models changing the
PC prior distribution of the parameters of the Mate´rn correlation function (range
and standard deviation). For all three models, we chose the typical standard devia-
tion σ = 2, so that P (σ > 2 = 0.5), which corresponds to twice the default value. In
this framework, we assume a higher variation in the spatial structure. Furthermore,
in order to assess potential effect with a more limited spatial autocorrelation a pri-
ori, we set the typical range r = 1, 000 [km] for the L, S, and F models, such that
P (r > 1, 000 [km] = 0.5).
The mean and the credible intervals of the estimated coefficients β and the param-
eters of the Mate´rn covariance function (τ , r) are illustrated for the L (Figure 7a), S
(Figure 7b), and F (Figure 7c) models, where default priors ( ) and modified priors
( ) are specified. For better interpretability, priors are set on the standard deviation
σ instead of τ , with P (σ > 1 = 0.5) and P (r > 1, 911 [km]) > 0.5. The models with
alternative priors use a higher typical variance, with P (σζ > 2 = 0.5), and a smaller
typical range, with P (r > 1, 000 [km]) > 0.5. Both mean and credible intervals of all
parameters are not affected.
In addition, we assess potential effects of the mesh size on the results. Using two
different meshes with number of vertices (n1 = 2, 157 and n2 = 1, 341), the results of
the L-model are not affected except that βethpol is negative and marginally significant
with mesh size n2. In the S-model, all covariate coefficients are robust except that
βlum becomes negative and significant with mesh size n1 and n2. The results of the
F -model are not affected. As a complementary robustness test, we assess potential
effects on the results of the F -model by using different levels of spatial aggregation
of the data based on different radius values (rad = {0.25◦, 0.75◦, 1◦, 1.5◦}). Except
for βlum, which loses significance at a 1.5
◦ level of aggregation, all other coefficients
are robust to all four alternative levels of aggregation (results not reported).
4. Discussion
This study proposes a Bayesian hierarchical framework to model the lethality of ter-
rorism, severity, and frequency of lethal terrorist attacks across the world between
2010 and 2015. The statistical framework integrates spatial and temporal depen-
dencies through a GMRF whose parameters have been estimated with R-INLA. The
novelty of this study lies in its ability to systematically capture the effects of factors
that explain the aforementioned three characteristics of lethal terrorism worldwide
and at subnational levels. Moreover, the analysis of hot-spots at subnational level
provides key insight into understanding the spatial dynamics of lethal terrorism that
occurred worldwide from 2010 to 2015. In this Section, we highlight the main find-
ings and limitations of this study, and suggest potential improvement, which could
be carried out in future studies.
20 Python et al.
−0.04
−0.02
0.00
0.02
β
0
β
altitud
e
β
b
o
rd
e
r
β
ethp
ol
β
lu
m
β
p
olity
β
p
op
β
tt r τ
(a)
L
eth
ality
L
-m
o
d
el:
B
ern
ou
lli
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
β
0
β
lu
m
β
ethp
ol
β
p
ol
β
tt r τ
(b
)
S
everity
S
-m
o
d
el:
P
o
isso
n
−0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
β
0
β
lu
m
β
p
op
β
tt r τ
(c)
F
req
u
en
cy
F
-m
o
d
el:
P
oisson
F
ig
.
7:
L
e
th
a
lity
o
f
te
rro
rism
,
a
n
d
se
v
e
rity
a
n
d
fre
q
u
e
n
c
y
o
f
le
th
a
l
te
rro
rist
a
tta
ck
s:
ro
b
u
stn
e
ss
te
st
o
f
th
e
p
a
ra
m
e
te
rs
o
f
th
e
M
a
te´
rn
c
o
v
a
ria
n
c
e
fu
n
c
tio
n
.
E
stim
ation
of
th
e
m
ean
an
d
th
e
95%
cred
ib
le
in
tervals
(lin
e
segm
en
t)
of
th
e
p
o
sterior
d
istrib
u
tio
n
o
f
th
e:
in
tercep
t
β
0 ,
covariates
β
,
an
d
sp
atial
p
aram
eters
(ran
ge
r
an
d
p
recision
τ
o
f
th
e
M
ate´rn
cova
rian
ce
fu
n
ctio
n
).
O
n
all
th
ree
m
o
d
els
(leth
ality
of
terrorism
(F
igu
re
7a),
sev
erity
(F
igu
re
7b
)
an
d
freq
u
en
cy
(F
igu
re
7c)
o
f
leth
a
l
terro
rist
attack
s),
th
e
resu
lts
are
rob
u
st
to
th
e
ch
oice
of
p
riors.
Modelling Subnational Spatial Dynamics of Terrorism 21
Piazza (2006) suggested that more economically developed and literate societies
with high standards of living may exhibit more lucrative targets, and therefore are
expected to be more targeted by terrorist attacks. While most country-level studies
did not find a significant relationship between the number of terrorist attacks and
economic variables (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Abadie, 2006; Drakos and Gofas,
2006; Krueger and Laitin, 2008; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011), we showed that
areas with higher human activity are more prone to encounter a higher number of
lethal attacks, which brings support to Piazza’s theory at subnational level. However,
our study does not allow us to extend these findings to he lethality of terrorism and
the number of deaths of lethal attacks since the estimated effects are not significant.
In comparison with rural areas, cities provide more human mobility, anonymity,
and recruitment pool for terrorists (Crenshaw, 1990, p. 115; Savitch and Ardashev,
2001) and offer a higher number of vulnerable human targets, including: govern-
ment officials, mayors and location with vulnerable civilian targets (e.g. inside bus,
shopping malls, or theatres) (Hoffman, 2006, p. 167). Attacks in cities may provoke
an impact on a larger audience, which is often a desired outcome (Laqueur, 1999,
p. 41; Crenshaw, 1990, p. 115; Savitch and Ardashev, 2001). Not surprisingly, the
frequency of lethal attacks is positively correlated with population density.
Furthermore, terrorists benefit from high density communication network (road
and rail) in large cities to move freely and rapidly from and to target points (Heyman
and Mickolus, 1980; Wilkinson, 1979, p. 189). It is also not uncommon that terror-
ists deliberately target communication network infrastructure, as exemplified by the
March 11, 2004 simultaneous attacks on several commuter trains in Madrid, Spain,
which killed 191 people (Los Angeles Times, 2014). As expected, the frequency of
lethal attacks is negatively correlated with the distance to large cities.
The theory of “provocation” may explain the positive association observed be-
tween ethnic polarisation and the number of deaths per attack and the number of
lethal attacks. As pointed out in Esteban et al. (2012) however, one should acknowl-
edge that ethnic polarisation is only one possible measure of ethnic division among
others, including ethnic fractionalisation. Further analysis using different approaches
to measure ethnic division is required in order to assess the role of ethnic division in
its wider sense.
The effect of democracy on terrorism is still under debate. However, it has been
often acknowledge that democracies are more inclined to experience terrorism than
autocracies (Chenoweth, 2013). Our results showed that areas with higher level
of democracy—measured through the variable Polity IV —tend to encounter more
deaths when attacks are lethal, which brings support to Pape (2003, 2006) who found
a positive association between suicide terrorism—a type of terrorist attacks with a
high potential to generate many casualties—and the level of democracy. Further
studies allowing to distinguish suicide attacks from other types of terrorist events
might complement our global analysis.
As with any statistical analyses of complex social phenomena, the outcome of
this study should be taken with caution. First, since we aim to investigate terrorism
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across the entire world and at high spatial resolution, the availability of suitable
covariates is limited. As a result, our study has unavoidably omitted numerous rele-
vant drivers of the three investigated facets of lethal terrorism, which include personal
features (e.g. character traits, psychological processes) of each member of terrorist
groups, ideology, beliefs, and cultural factors (Crenshaw, 1983, p. 29; Wilkinson,
1990, p. 151; Brynjar and Skjølberg, 2000; Richardson, 2006, pp. 92-93), or recip-
rocal interactions between counterterrorism and terrorism (English, 2010; Hoffman,
2002). We are unable to estimate the marginal effect of individual unobserved factors,
their aggregated effects have been however taken into account through the space-time
dependence structure represented by the GMRF.
Second, one could reasonably expect some spatial variability in the lethality of
terrorism and frequency and severity of lethal terrorist attacks, especially within
large cities that are regularly targeted by terrorists. However, since terrorist events
from GTD are reported at the centroid of the nearest city in which they occurred,
spatial variability of terrorism within cities cannot be captured. Also, we excluded
spatially inaccurate events, which reduced the number of observations. However this
operation did not affect the temporal trends in the data. The mean and standard
deviation of the annual number of lethal attacks remain robust to this data selection
process. The models discussed in this article assume both stationarity—invariance
to translation—and isotropy—invariance to rotation. However, one might consider
the processes driving terrorist attacks to be non-stationary (e.g. attacks may cluster
in one region, but occur at random in other locations) or anisotropic (e.g. terrorist
attacks increase in frequency systematically in some direction). The range might
vary according to the the number of fatalities generated by the attacks and/or media
outreach. Mass-casualty attacks might typically influence other terrorist groups on
a wide scale through a broad media coverage. Further studies might investigate the
use of non-stationary models, which have been recently investigated for the model
class that may be fitted with INLA (Ingebrigtsen et al., 2015).
Third, the temporal unit exhibits limitations as well. Our study period is discre-
tised into five years, which allows capturing variability on a relatively large temporal
scale. The temporal accuracy of GTD allows the analysis of terrorism on a finer
temporal granularity, which might find practical applications in e.g. counterterrorism
operations which require daily analysis. For computational reasons, we assume no
interaction between spatial and temporal dependencies of the lethality of terrorism,
severity, and frequency of lethal terrorist attacks (i.e. separable space-time models),
where the covariance structure can be written as the product of a purely spatial and
a purely temporal covariance function for all space-time locations (Gneiting et al.,
2006). In our models, the GMRFs follow a first-order random walk in time. In
non-separable models, the dependencies structure in both space and time is usually
highly complex (Harvill, 2010), and therefore more computationally demanding.
Fourth, future studies might combine each individual response (L-S-F) in a prin-
cipled statistical framework in order to evaluate similarities and differences across
each investigated process of lethal terrorism. Such an endeavour might face identi-
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fiability and computational challenges—a three-dimensional response would require
four shared GMRFs: a shared field for each pair of responses (L-S, L-F, and S-F)
and a field between all three fields and each individual response (L-S-F), along with
a response specific field (L, S, and F). One way of preventing potential computa-
tional barriers would be to exclude the temporal dimension (i.e. a spatial instead
of a spatio-temporal analysis) and/or to reduce the size of the area of interest (e.g.
analysing the processes within a few countries only) and hence the mesh size.
Fifth, subjective choices have been made throughout the entire modelling process,
which might affect both the internal and external validity of our results. A major
concern is the absence of consensus on the definition of terrorism (Beck and Miner,
2013; Jackson, 2016), and subjectivity is therefore inevitable (Hoffman, 2006, p. 23).
In line with English (2010, pp. 24-25), we agree that is all the more important that
studies on terrorism must clearly state how terrorism is understood. Accordingly,
we use data from GTD, which clearly states the definition used to classify acts as
terrorist events. Moreover, as with any Bayesian analysis, our study involves a degree
of subjectivity with regard to the choice of priors. Because of our relatively large
dataset, we are confident that the choice of priors does not influence our results,
as confirmed by our prior sensitivity analysis (Section 3). However, subjectivity
remains in the definition of the threshold for hot-spots. We have chosen ones which
ensures that the probability of lethal attacks is higher than non-lethal and that the
expected number of deaths and lethal attacks correspond to high percentile. We
recommend practitioners and researchers in the field of terrorism to take particular
care in choosing cut-off values, which might vary according to the purpose of their
study.
This study suggested a Bayesian framework to investigating the subnational spa-
tial dynamics of the lethality of terrorism and the severity and frequency of lethal
terrorist attacks that occurred across the world from 2010 to 2015. It identified, es-
timated, and subtly analysed distinct impacts of several important drivers involved
in three different facets of lethal terrorism. Hence, the results of this work pro-
vided a systematic assessment of theories at a subnational level. Furthermore, the
uncertainty of the predictions accounted in the modelling process remains crucial
for policy-makers to make informed decisions (Zammit-Mangion et al., 2013, p. 64)
or to evaluate the impact of counterterrorism policies (Perl, 2007). Ultimately, this
research may provide complementary tools to enhance the efficacy of preventive coun-
terterrorism policies.
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